Outsourcing Criminal Deportees by Brown, Eleanor Marie Lawrence
Outsourcing Criminal Deportees
Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brownt
The cat is chasing its tail. They deport criminals to us and
we inevitably export criminals right back to them.
Senator K.D. Knight,
INTRODUCTION
Source-labor countries-states that "export" migrants-are
virtually invisible in immigration law scholarship. Notwith-
standing. the growing recognition that ever more people live
transnational lives,2 the dominant conceptualization of immigra-
tion law and policy in the United States remains uni-nationally
oriented. Under this approach, most immigration questions
hinge on reforming and enacting federal laws.
"Crimmigration" scholarship-located at the intersection of
criminal and immigration law-embodies this uni-national par-
adigm.3 Recent contributions by Professors Mariano-Florentino
Cuflar and David Sklansky epitomize this focus on the domestic
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Former Schwartz Fellow, New America Foundation; Former Chairman of the Jamaica
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lumbia Circuit; Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Keith Ellison, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas; JD 1999, Yale University; MPhil Politics 1997
(Rhodes Scholar), University of Oxford.
1 Interview with Senator the Honorable K.D. Knight, Former Minister of National
Security and Justice in Jamaica and Former Chairman of the Caribbean Community
Committee on National Security (July 4, 2012) (on file with author). .
2 The transnationality of the alien population is a major theme in the sociological
literature, yet largely unincorporated into legal scholarship. For a summary of the
transnationalism research, see Peggy Levitt, Salsa and Ketchup: Transnational Mi-
grants Straddle Two Worlds, in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, eds, The Contexts
Reader 445, 450-51 (Norton 2008).
3 The term was first used formally in the literature by Professor Juliet Stumpf to
describe the increasing overlap of criminal and immigration law. See Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am U L Rev 367,
381 (2006).
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political economies of immigration law enforcement.4 According
to Professors Cu6llars and Sklansky, prosecutorial choices have
been warped by transaction costs in policy making that impli-
cate coordination between entities with overlapping and some-
times conflicting mandates.* Absurdly, this results in immigra-
tion disproportionately consuming federal law enforcement
resources. Indeed, immigration cases-most involving relatively
minor infractions-now constitute the majority of federal crimi-
nal prosecutions.7
Compounding these absurd enforcement choices, the United
States spends significant resources on incarcerating deportees-
in-waiting, aliens with final convictions who are already subject
to deportation orders.9 While Professors Cuellar and Sklansky
solely consider domestic decision makers, Professor Peter
Schuck believes that this domestic focus exacerbates resource
4 Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 UC
Irvine L Rev 1, 31-32 (2012); David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc
Instrumentalism, 15 New Crim L Rev 157, 160-1 (2012).
5 Professor Cu611a3s "macro" view emphasizes that bizarre enforcement choices
inevitably result from the messy compromises in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (INA), Pub L No 82-414, ch 477, 66 Stat 163, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1101
et seq. See Cudllar, 2 UC Irvine L Rev at 3 (cited in note 4). This point is also well made
in the chapters addressing inadmissibility, deportability, and relief from removal in two
leading immigration law texts. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, et al, Immigration and
Citizenship: Process and Policy 582-84 (West 7th ed 2012); Stephen H. Legomsky and
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 514-92 (Foundation
5th ed 2009).
6 For a further discussion of this issue, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigra-
tion, 104 Nw U L Rev 1281, 1352-53 (2010); Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration
through Crime, 109 Colum L Rev Sidebar 135, 139 (Dec 12, 2009), online at http:l
www.columbialawreview.org/wp-contentiuploads/2009/12/135-Chacon.pdf (visited Mar 3,
2013); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law Asymmetric Incorpora-
tion of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash & Lee L Rev 469, 476-80 (2007); Teresa A. Mil-
ler, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17
Georgetown Immig L J 611, 639 (2003).
7 See Sklansky, 15 New Crim L Rev at 166-67 (cited in note 4). Moreover, more
than 90 percent of criminal immigration prosecutions are for illegal entry and reentry,
both nonviolent crimes. See id at 167-69.
8 The term is a play on Professor Hiroshi Motomura's "Americans in waiting." Hi-
roshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship
in the United States 8-9 (Oxford 2006).
9 Professor Peter H. Schuck's Deportation before Incarceration focuses on this pop-
ulation. Peter H. Schuck, Deportation before Incarceration, 171 Pol Rev 73, 78 (2012);
Peter H. Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons: Rethinking an Anachro-
nistic Policy *53-54 (Yale Law School Public Law Working Paper No 266, Mar 12, 2012),
online at http://papers.esrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805931 (visited Mar 3,
2013).
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constraints.,o His contribution is groundbreaking: unlike tradi-
tional scholarship, Professor Schuck considers how the United
States allocates its enforcement resources more broadly in the
context of international decision makers."
Given the voluminous enforcement obligations imposed by
multiple immigration statutes, 2 US law enforcement cannot
merely identify and remove the myriad people subject to remov-
al, even if they narrow their focus to aliens who commit (pre-
sumably more serious) nonimmigration crimes.'3 Simply put, the
system is overwhelmed. Where better to look for help than to
countries from which these aliens came? As Professor Schuck
notes, "Simply stated, the federal government should deport
10 The resource constraints are so extreme as to have necessitated Supreme Court
intervention in at least one state, with all the accompanying policy pressures. See Brown
v Plata, 131 S Ct 1910, 1923 (2011) (affirming a lower court's mandate that California
reduce its prison population to halt violations of the Eighth Amendment). See also
Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 78 (cited in note 9).
11 Other than Professor Schuck, the only other significant piece of scholarship that
takes this approach is an article by Professors Tomer Broude and Doron Teichman. See
Tomer Broude and Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political
Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 Vand L Rev 795, 810-14 (2009). Professor
Schuck is particularly focused on the prisoner transfer treaty (PTT) regime, an interna-
tional legal arrangement whereby foreign-national prisoners may serve their sentences in
their countries of nationality. See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 79-80 (cited in note 9).
12 See, for example, INA, 66 Stat 163; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,
Pub L No 89-236, 79 Stat 911, codified as amended at 8 USC § 1151 et seq; Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub L No 99-603, 100 Stat 3359, codified as
amended in various sections of Title 8; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546, codified in vari-
ous sections of Title 8. The broad statutory framework of US immigration law is con-
tained within the INA, IRCA, and IIRIRA. The INA laid the foundation of the modern
immigration system. Various amendments, particularly those made by the 1965 and
1990 Immigration Acts, emphasized the family unit by offering many family-based visas,
developed a focus on highly skilled, employment-based immigration, and eliminated the
existing national origin quotas. The 1986 IRCA introduced employer sanctions in order
to reduce employment of unauthorized aliens (and simultaneously provided a path to
legalization for some undocumented immigrants). The 1996 IIRIRA increased enforce-
ment capacity to both prosecute undocumented immigration and remove criminal immi-
grants (these measures were extended following September 11, 2001). See Legomsky and
Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy at 1-11 (cited in note 5); Aleinikoff,
et al, Immigration and Citizenship. Process and Policy at 1-36 (cited in note 5).
13 The United States has recently articulated such a policy shift in its focus on
prosecutorial discretion, whereby it will only focus on persons who commit nonimmigra-
tion crimes. See Julia Preston, In Test of Deportation Policy, 1 in 6 Get a Fresh Look and
a Reprieve, NY Times A13 (Jan 20, 2012); John Morton, Director, Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (ICE), Memorandum for all Field Directors, Special Agents in Charge,
Chief Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Al-
iens 5 (June 17, 2011), online at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdfl
prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
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some immigrant criminals before they enter prison, not after."4
Professor Schuck appears impatient with US officials whom he
considers too "soft" with countries-like Mexico-that repeatedly
resist entreaties to expeditiously receive their deported nation-
als.'@ Professor Schuck advocates a tougher approach wherein
the United States strategically utilizes its regional heft to pres-
sure the reluctant Latin American and Caribbean countries-
from which most migrant criminals originate.17
What explains Professor Schuck's frustration? Efforts to
clarify what incentives drive decision makers in developing
countries are necessarily multidisciplinary. Consider the public
choice literature's discussion of the political economy of decen-
tralized governance and its implications for institutional design.
According to public choice theorists, states, seeking to maximize
their own welfare, compete to ward off criminal behavior, even if
this shifts criminal behavior elsewhere.18 Negative externalities
inevitably result for neighboring states. Indeed, two scholars
have described the evolution of a global race wherein states
compete to "outsource" crime.19
Herein lies Professor Schuck's frustration. It is unsurprising
that developing countries resist what they rightly consider to be
US efforts to outsource "bad types."20 Yet Professor Schuck's im-
patience belies a more fundamental question: How do we struc-
ture a system that provides appropriate incentives for source-
labor countries to share the burdens when their nationals break
US laws? This Article contends that proper incentives will beget
14 Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 78 (cited in note 9) (emphasis added).
15 The PTT is the typical prisoner transfer mechanism. A PIT is an international
agreement allowing one country to transfer its foreign-national prisoner to that prisoner's
home country to serve his sentence. For a good summary of the PIT regime, see id at 80.
Professor Schuck would ask countries of origin not only to accept criminal aliens as
soon as an order of deportation is entered but also to assume responsibility for incarcer-
ating them. His bottom line: it would be significantly cheaper for the United States to
deport first and incarcerate later. See id at 82.
16 I do not address the broader legal issues that necessarily attend such a contro-
versial proposal. I am concerned with the narrow strategic question of whether this is a
wise move.
17 See Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons at Appendix 1 (cited
in note 9).
18 See, for example, Broude and Teichman, 62 Vand L Rev at 830-31 (cited in note
11). See also Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization
and Crime Control in International Relations 7-13 (Oxford 2006).
19 Broude and Teichman, 62 Vand L Rev at 814 (cited in note 11).
20 The term "bad type" is from Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order
Structure of Immigration Law, 59 Stan L Rev 809, 855 (2007).
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cooperation. Indeed, there are likely many axes of interest con-
vergence between the United States and source-labor countries.
In a fascinating permutation of the globalization narrative,
consider the cash flows resulting from US immigration policy.
Migrants are prolific sources of greenbacks back home.21 Many
developing countries' governments now depend on US visa allo-
cations for hard currency flows.22 Moreover, the interests of
business elites in developing countries are well aligned with the
United States-migrants have become big business. Consider
Haiti: Although it is the poorest country in the Western hemi-
sphere, there has been substantial investment in its telecom-
munications sector in recent years.23 Haitian economic growth is
inextricably intertwined with migration. A utility bill in Port au
Prince is often paid by a New York relative.24 It is no accident
that several newly minted Forbes Latin American billionaires
benefited from the explosion of sectors that migrants utilize
heavily-telecommunications, banking, and transportation.25
21 This is primarily through remittances-money sent from the United States to a
migrant's home country. The World Bank has argued in a recent annual migration re-
port that worldwide labor mobility trends will continue to lead migrant workers to re-
main significant economic drivers for their home countries. See Global Economic Pro-
spects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration 25-31 (World Bank 2006).
22 The term hard currency is typically utilized to refer to benchmark currencies
such as the Euro and the dollar. See id at 99; Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining
MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty 124 (United Nations Development
Programme 2011).
23 Digicel, an Irish telecommunications conglomerate, signed up two million Hai-
tian customers in three years. Digicel Haiti Reaches 2.1 Million Customers, TeleGeogra-
phy (May 5, 2009), online at http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdatel
articles/2009/05/05/digicel-haiti-reaches-2-1-million-customers (visited Mar 3, 2013); Sa-
rah Stack, Digicel Boss O'Brien Named as Haiti Goodwill Ambassador, Irish Examiner
(Feb 20, 2010), online at http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/kfkfcwgbkfaul
rss2/#ixzzoupXcofS4 (visited Mar 3, 2013).
24 See Manuel Orozeo, Understanding the Remittance Economy in Haiti, Inter-
American Dialogue 16 (Mar 15, 2006), online at http://www.thedialogue.org/
publicationfiles/understanding%20the%20remittance%2economy%20in%20haiti.pdf
(visited Mar 3, 2013).
For a summary of the tranenationalism research, see Levitt, Salsa and Ketchup at
450-51 (cited in note 2). I acknowledge that my utilization of the transnationalism con-
cept is unconventional. The sociology literature generally refers to transnational mi-
grants as citizens or permanent residents of two societies. However, similar issues are
clearly raised in this context. Professors Cristina Rodriguez and Kim Barry have made
similar points in the context of citizenship theory. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Book Re-
view, The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age, 106 Mich L Rev 1111, 1122-26
(2008); Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration
Context, 81 NYU L Rev 11, 14-15 (2006).
25 I am grateful to the journalist Andr6s Martinez for emphasizing this point. Ma-
nuel Orozco's work is particularly helpful in illustrating the extent to which migrants
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Citizens receiving remittances are also less likely to impose
welfare costs on the state. Moreover, in part due to increased
remittance flows, credit markets opened up in the developing
world, underwritten by Western bond investors.26 Although re-
mittances are still considered unconventional inflows (constitut-
ing neither aid nor investments), they easily outpace foreign aid
and direct investment as the largest source of overseas inflows
to the developing world.
Indeed, visa allocations are arguably de facto foreign aid.
Professor Charles Reich's observation that federal licenses-
although theoretically temporary and revocable-provide many
states and localities with significant support 27 seems particular-
ly relevant in an international framework. To utilize his famous
"new property" concept: the federal government, by issuing vi-
sas, is a primary facilitator of financial support both for mi-
grants' families and for governments in the developing world.
In another permutation of the globalization narrative, the
United States asks virtually nothing formally of these govern-
ments for these benefits,28 though they are clearly well incentiv-
ized to meet certain critical immigration law goals.29 Moreover, a
comparative approach indicates that this laissez-faire US atti-
tude contrasts with that of the European Union, where member
fueled the growth of telecommunications, banking, and transportation businesses. Ma-
nuel Orozco, Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues and Perspectives on
Development 13-14 (Organization of American States Sept 2004), online at http://www
.frbatlanta.org/news/CoNFEREN/payments04/orozco.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). Carloe
Slim Held, who is ranked number one on the Forbes list, built his wealth partly through
his ownership of Mexico's primary telecommunications company, which has benefited
heavily from transnational telecommunications traffic. Emilio Azcrraga, another Mexi-
can billionaire, also has significant telecommunications holdings. Luis Carlos Sarmiento,
the Colombian billionaire, Gustavo Julio Vollmer, the Venezuelan billionaire, and Pedro
Moreira Salles, the Brazilian billionaire, have significant banking interests, all of which
own subsidiaries specializing in remittance transfers. See Kerry A. Dolan, Secret Meeting
of Latin American Billionaires, Forbes (May 23, 2003), online at http://www.forbes.com/
2003/05/23/czkd_0523mexico.htmIl (visited Mar 3, 2013). See also The World's Billion-
aires, Forbes (March 2012), online at http://www.forbes.com/bilhionaires/list (visited Mar
3, 2013).
26 Indeed, prior to the global financial crisis, "remittance securitization" was a hot,
new field on Wall Street. See Global Economic Prospects at 101-04 (cited in note 21).
27 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L J 733, 734-35 (1964).
28 See Antie Ellermann, Negotiating Unilateralism: Deportation and Interstate Co-
operation in Germany and the United States *7-8 (Conference Paper, Mar 2003), online
at http://aei.pitt.edu/7060/1/000427.PDF (visited Mar 3, 2013).
29 The United States' inclination to tie foreign aid to its policy goals is emphasized
in Jeanne A.K. Hey, Introducing Small State Foreign Policy, in Jeanne A.K. Hey, ed,
Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior 1, 1 (Lynne Rienner
2003).
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states increasingly impose immigration-related obligations on
source-labor countries as a condition of granting visas.30 The
question becomes: How might the United States leverage rela-
tions with source-labor governments to further US immigration
goals?
In contrast to Professor Schuck's formulation, this Article
advocates a soft approach-a modified auction system wherein
the United States allocates visas to high-value source-labor
countries.31 A high-value source-labor country is one well placed
to help the United States meet its own immigration goals. In
such a system, developing countries bid for labor-market access
for their nationals by demonstrating that they are well placed to
help find visa recipients who meet US policy goals.32
One potential policy goal is for source-labor countries to help
identify, prior to admission, the most law-abiding prospective
30 I am grateful to officials of the Ministry of the Interior of Spain for making this
point and to Professor Patrick Weil for guiding me to the supporting literature. For a
good summary of immigration agreements and obligations that European Union member
states impose on source-labor countries, see Patrick Weil, All or Nothing? What the Unit-
ed States Can Learn from Europe as It Contemplates Circular Migration and Legaliza-
tion for Undocumented Immigrants 6-9, 12-13 (German Marshall Fund Immigration
Paper Series, Apr 2010), online at http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/GMF7610
_lLWeil_final.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). See also Philip L. Martin, Susan F. Martin,
and Patrick Weil, Managing Migration: The Promise of Cooperation 123 (Lexington
2006). It bears emphasis: Some of these immigration agreements between European Un-
ion member states and source-labor countries have been controversial. Indeed, Italy's
tolerance for human rights abuses by the former Gaddafi regime in Libya has been at-
tributed to its reliance on Libya for immigration policing. See Italy's Immigration Deal
with Libya Sparks Uproar (EurActiv June 11, 2009), online at http://www.euractiv
.com/justicelitalys-immigration-deal-libya-sp-news-221943 (visited Mar 3, 2013).
31 The primary proposals are put forth by Professors Gary S. Becker, Julian L. Si-
mon, and Barry R. Chiswick. See Gary S. Becker, An Open Door for Immigrants-The
Auction, Wall St J A14 (Oct 14, 1992); Julian L. Simon, The Economic Consequences of
Immigration 329-35 (Basil Blackwell 1989); Barry R. Chiswick, The Impact of Immigra-
tion on the Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being, in Barry R. Chiswick, ed, The
Gateway: U.S. Immigration Issues and Policies 289, 308-10 (American Enterprise Insti-
tute 1982). Professors Becker and Simon are discussed favorably but briefly in Peter H.
Schuck, The Morality of Immigration Policy, 45 San Diego L Rev 865, 892-93 (2008), and
Professors Becker, Simon, and Chiswick in Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration
as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U Pa L Rev
1147, 1160-61 (1997). It bears emphasizing that in most such proposals, visas are not
conventional property. For example, the government would sell the visa to the recipient.
However, the recipient would not be authorized to then sell the visa. Other proposals
would allow recipients to sell visas, but only into a limited prescreened pool of persons
for national security reasons.
32 Notably, however, the proposal does not involve actually selling visas, as has
been advocated in other controversial auction proposals.
2013] 65
66 The University of Chicago Law Review [80:59
migrants33 In the event of breaches, high-value source-labor
countries would commit to expeditiously accepting and incarcer-
ating criminal deportees. They would also commit to reintegra-
tion initiatives to enable a rough tracking program; when a
criminal deportee drops off the radar, a source-labor country
would alert the United States that the deportee may seek to
reenter the United States illegally.
Given the important communal values that incarceration
serves, the United States must insist on a reasonable period of
incarceration in source-labor countries (as opposed to early re-
lease).34 Simultaneously, those migrant criminals who are eligi-
ble for early transfer to their country of origin should be low-
level offenders. Resource-constrained source-labor countries
with weak institutional frameworks are rightly concerned about
the early return of high-level offenders, given their potential in-
volvement in transnational narcotics gangs.35 Moreover, hard
33 I acknowledge a significant corruption concern in this proposal, as in any visa-
allocation program, where typically the number of qualified applicants exceeds the num-
ber of visa slots. The risk is particularly significant in developing countries with lax anti-
corruption protocols.
34 Indeed, some might contend that the important communal values incarceration
serves are actually undermined when persons who commit crime in the United States
serve their sentences overseas. For a widely cited piece discussing the important com-
munal values that are served by incarceration, see Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, So-
cial Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va L Rev 349, 383-85 (1997). See also Dan M. Kahan,
What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U Chi L Rev 591, 594-605 (1996); Paul H. Rob-
inson and John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw U L Rev 453, 471-88 (1997); Al-
vin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in J. Roland Pennock and John W.
Chapman, eds, Criminal Justice 289, 292-95, 301-04 (New York 1985). But see Bernard
E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 Mich L Rev 291, 294-97 (1998).
35 See Jonah M. Temple, Note, The Merry-Go-Round of Youth Gangs: The Failure of
the U.S. Immigration Removal Policy and the False Outsourcing of Crime, 31 BC Third
World L J 193, 196-97 (2011); Salvador A. Cicero-Dominguez, Assessing the U.S.-Mexico
Fight against Human Trafficking and Smuggling: Unintended Results of U.S. Immigra-
tion Policy, 4 Nw U J Intl Hum Rts 303, 320 (2005); Hal Brands, Crime, Violence, and
the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State *25-26 (Strategic Stud-
ies Institute May 2010), online at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mill
pdffiles/PUB986.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013); Garfield 0. Blake, America's Deadly Export:
Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data of Deportation and Homicide Rates *11-13 (Sir
Arthur Lewis Institute of Social & Economic Studies 11th Annual Conference, Mar
2010), online at http://sta.uwi.edulconferencesl09/salises/documents/G%2O0Blake.pdf (vis-
ited Mar 3, 2013); Deportees in Latin America and the Caribbean, Hearing and Briefing
before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 110th Cong, 1st Sess 50-53 (2007) (statement of Nestor Rodriguez, PhD, Chair-
man of the Department of Sociology, University of Houston); Freddy Funes, Note, Re-
moval of Central American Gang Members: How Immigration Laws Fail to Reflect Global
Reality, 63 U Miami L Rev 301, 306-13 (2008).
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empirical questions remain about the financial implications of
this new approach for both federal and state budgets, and for
cost sharing between the United States and source-labor coun-
tries, perhaps through foreign-aid budgets.
While I agree with Professor Schuck's instinct that coun-
tries of origin currently do too little risk sharing, this proposal
differs in critical ways from his approach. Herein lies the diffi-
culty with Professor Schuck's proposal: In recommending that
the United States persuade developing countries to expeditious-
ly accept and incarcerate their nationals, Professor Schuck
would essentially ask developing countries to bear some risk on
the "back end" (at the time of an alien's incarceration), despite
minimal input on the "front end" (when the alien entered the
United States).36 Implicit in his proposal is a recognition that
developing countries are better incentivized to share costs on the
back end if they have some say on the front end. Moreover,
through this proposal, the United States can maintain many of
the features that make an auction attractive while eliminating
the controversial features of an auction, such as the sale of visas.
In Part I, I contend that Professor Schuck is more correct than
is apparent on first glance. Analogizing from Anglo-American con-
tract law, I conceptualize a visa as a contract between the United
States and the migrant, and reflect on who bears the risk when
the migrant breaches by committing a crime3 Migrant criminals
have essentially been able to defer the consequences of their con-
tract violation for years.=8 Preliminary qualitative field work
among deportees-in-waiting in Canada indicates that many mi-
grant criminals prefer incarceration in Canada to freedom in a de-
veloping country.39 Under the current model, should a migrant
36 Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 81-82 (cited in note 9).
37 Professor Motomura offers a vigorous critique of contract analysis in the immi-
gration context. Motomura, Americans in Waiting at 9-10 (cited in note 8) (distinguish-
ing the view of "immigration as contract" with actual contract law due to the lack of bar-
gaining, formal legal documents outlining the contract, and the unequal bargaining
position of those who seek admission).
38 Jamaican criminologist Annmarie Barnes conducted qualitative fieldwork among
incarcerated Jamaicans in Canada regarding their deportation preferences. Annmarie
Barnes, Transnational Dislocations: The Use of Deporation as Crime Control *152-55
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2007) (on file at University of To-
ronto) (conjecturing that the slight majority of criminal deportees who said they pre-
ferred deportation to extra prison time knew they had no right to be in the country and
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breach the visa contract through criminal behavior, the state will
inevitably bear many of the costs. My proposal seeks to change
this calculus by adding a third party-the source-labor country. If
the source-labor state and the United States change the default
rule to one wherein certain categories of nonviolent criminals
serve their sentences in their countries of origin, a migrant will
no longer be able to defer the consequences of his contract
breach.
Part II presents a more detailed case that significant num-
bers of developing countries depend on US largesse through ei-
ther the de jure extension of visas or the de facto extension of vi-
sa-like privileges through lax federal immigration enforcement.
I also consider the implications of Professor Reich's "new proper-
ty" concept for how the United States might persuade develop-
ing countries to share burdens.40
In Part III, I argue that Professor Schuck's proposal is a
"shot across the bow" in an outsourcing race, which recent histo-
ry indicates is unlikely to benefit the United States. As rational
welfare-maximizing entities themselves, source-labor countries
may seek to re-outsource their criminal deportees-potentially
back to the United States. Utilizing basic game-theoretic anal-
yses, I lay out the incentives for source-labor countries to enter
this outsourcing race. In Part IV, I consider how these incentives
might be changed for the source-labor countries and criminal
deportees. Finally, in Part V, I put forth an alternative proposal
in which visas are allocated to high-value source-labor countries,
which help the United States meet its own law enforcement pol-
icy goals. Under the alternative proposal discussed here, source-
labor countries will ultimately transform into good insourcing
states. Moreover, criminal deportees will choose to remain in
their countries of origin because there will be incentives for
them to do so.
40 I discuss this concept elsewhere. Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Prop-
erty, Visa as Collateral, 64 Vand L Rev 1047, 1084-86 (2011).
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I. EXPLORING THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM:
CONCEPTUALIZING VISAS AS CONTRACTS
A. Background
Section 242(h) of the INA codifies the US policy of impris-
onment before deportation.4' In pertinent part, this provision re-
quires alien criminals to serve their sentences in the United
States. Congress appears generally disinclined to revisit this
rule,42 rejecting most efforts at amendment, even when excep-
tions to the rule would have been restricted to limited categories
of nonviolent offenders." Concurrently, Congress has signifi-
cantly expanded the category of crimes triggering deportation in
the past few decades." It has also removed most legal defenses
to deportation and reduced the availability of equitable, discre-
tionary relief from deportation," leaving virtually no release
valve. Thus, in recent years, many more persons have been in-
carcerated and subject to deportation,46 but it remains extraor-
dinarily difficult to transfer prisoners to their countries of origin
before incarceration.
Traditionally, there was no mechanism to execute such
transfers.4' The default rule of the United States and many oth-
er countries has been that one country should not implement the
criminal laws of another state.48 However, in the last few dec-
ades an international legal regime of prisoner transfer treaties
(PTTs) has evolved. PTTs allow countries to remove alien pris-
oners to their countries of origin to serve out the remainder of
their sentences.49 However, these treaties impose such onerous
conditions that transfers are rarely practicable.5o For instance,
41 See INA § 242(h), 8 USC § 1252(h).
42 The rule was enacted in 1917. See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 78 (cited in note 9).
43 See id at 79.
44 See Sklansky, 15 New Crim L Rev at 159-60 (cited in note 4).
45 See id; Stumpf, 56 Am U L Rev at 370-71 (cited in note 3); Chac6n, 109 Colum L
Rev Sidebar at 137-39 (cited in note 6); Legomsky, 64 Wash & Lee L Rev at 481 (cited in
note 6); Miller, 17 Georgetown Immig L J at 614 (cited in note 6); Eagly, 104 Nw U L Rev
at 1334-36 (cited in note 6).
46 See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 78 (cited in note 9).
47 See Michael Abbell, International Prisoner Transfer § 1-1 (Martinus Nijhoff 3d ed
2007).
48 See Michal Plachta, Transfer of Prisoners under International Instruments and
Domestic Legislation 304-10 (Freiburg im Breisgau 1993).
4 See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 79-80 (cited in note 9).
5o See id at 80.
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the prisoner must typically initiate and consent to the transfer,
and the receiving state must consent to receipt.51
As Professor Schuck demonstrates, these agreements ap-
pear to serve the United States poorly. First, few prisoners initi-
ate transfer requests.52 Second, even when the Department of
Justice approves such requests, it often experiences difficulty se-
curing cooperation from receiving states.53 The miniscule num-
ber of persons transferred-typically under two-hundred prison-
ers annually-testifies to the ineffectiveness of the international
legal arrangements.54
B. The Contract Analysis
Although not typically conceptualized in this way, let us im-
port familiar reasoning from Anglo-American contract law. If we
conceptualize a US visa as a contract between an alien and the
United States, the alien agrees to particular terms of good be-
havior as a condition of his visa contract. These terms include an
implicit agreement to obey US law. The question becomes: Who
should bear the risk if the alien violates the term of this con-
tract? On first glance, it would seem uncontroversial that the al-
ien usually bears the risk. Violating the contract through crimi-
nal behavior should typically lead to conviction, revocation of
one's visa, and deportation. However, one might argue that the
United States is currently bearing too much of the risk because
it is difficult to identify and apprehend noncompliant aliens. It is
precisely this sentiment that animates supporters of the contro-
versial state-level efforts to control undocumented migration,55
51 The Department of Justice (DOJ) typically weighs a number of considerations,
most importantly the severity of the crime involved and the likelihood of illegal reentry.
The DOJ also considers the prisoners likelihood of social rehabilitation and other law
enforcement concerns in determining whether to approve the transfer. Guidelines for
Evaluating Prisoner Transfer Applications (DOJ), online at http://www.justice.gov/
criminalloeoliptulguidelines.html (visited Mar 3, 2013).
52 See Schuck, Immigrant Criminals in Overcrowded Prisons at *50-51 (cited in
note 9).
53 See id at *51.
54 See id (noting there were 177 prisoners transferred in 2009).
55 See, for example, Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act
(SB 1070), 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 113, as amended by HB 2162, 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 211;
Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (HB 56), 2011 Ala Acts
535 (2011), codified at Ala Code § 31-13-19. The Alabama immigration statute was partial-
ly enjoined in United States v Alabama, 813 F Supp 2d 1282, 1351 (ND Ala 2011), revd in
part 691 F3d 1269 (11th Cir 2012). The Arizona statute was recently partially struck down
by the US Supreme Court in Arizona v United States, 132 S Ct 2492, 2510 (2012). For a good
summary of the opinion in Arizona, see generally David A. Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 Va
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which in part seek to raise the likelihood that aliens who violate
the terms of their visa contract will actually bear the risk.n
This is one potential reading of Professor Schuck's analysis.
His point is that an absurdity currently obtains: Even if an alien
is technically immediately deportable once his conviction is fi-
nal, in actuality the United States cannot deport him prior to in-
carceration without his consent and the consent of his original
country.57 Essentially, the noncompliant alien is able to defer
bearing the risk of his visa contract violation for several years.
Perversely, when an alien commits a crime and breaks his visa
contract, he may impose significant costs (such as incarceration
costsr*) on the United States-the alien simultaneously defers
his risk and consumes scarce tax dollars.59
This view is also supported by preliminary ethnographic
work that explored the decision-making matrices of Jamaican
deportees-in-waiting in Canada, which also regularly confronts
the problem of migrant criminals.eo When given a choice between
incarceration in Canada and incarceration in their country of
origin, the interviewees overwhelmingly chose Canada. Signifi-
cantly, close to half of interviewees indicated that they would
prefer to remain in a Canadian prison even if offered immediate
freedom in Jamaica.61
L Rev In Brief 41 (2012), online at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbriefl2012/04/
14/MartinWeb.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
56 See Randal C. Archibold and Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Serious Concern
among Americans about Immigration, NY Times A15 (May 4, 2010) (indicating a majori-
ty of US citizens believed that the Arizona law would reduce crime); Broad Approval for
New Arizona Immigration Law (Pew Research Center May 12, 2010), online at http://
pewresearch.org/pubs/1591/public-support-arizona-immigration-law-poll (visited Mar 3,
2013) (reporting general poll results on SB 1070).
57 See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 80 (cited in note 9).
58 On average, one year's incarceration of an inmate in a US prison costs $45,000.
See id at 78 (using the figure in the context of his proposal to reduce prison populations
by deporting some criminal noncitizens sooner).
59 Professor Schuck offers a robust political economy analysis for this absurdity:
interests with a stake in expanding prison populations, such as construction companies
and unions representing prison guards, have employed very effective lobbyists to repre-
sent their political interests in a peculiar instance of interest convergence between crim-
inal aliens who avoid deportation and prison guard unions. See id at 80.
60 See Canada Detention Profile (Global Detention Project July 2012), online at
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/canada/introduction.html (vis-
ited Mar 3, 2013).
61 Barnes asked Jamaican prisoners whether they would rather spend "a longer
period of imprisonment" in Canada or be deported immediately. Just under 50 percent
responded that they would prefer to remain in prison. Barnes, Transnational Disloca-
tions at *153 (cited in note 38). Among former prisoners who had already been deported
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This ethnographic work buttresses Professor Schuck's anal-
ysis. Consider also the more general implications of the afore-
mentioned study. The typical alien convicted of a crime is from a
resource-constrained developing country. Facing a choice be-
tween prison in the United States and prison in that developing
country, prison in the United States is likely preferable.62
Given that it is impractical to ask a noncompliant alien to
contribute to the incarceration costs that he imposes on the
United States, Professor Schuck would deprive certain catego-
ries of nonviolent offenders of the choice to serve their prison
terms in the United States.6* In the next Part, I explore the in-
centives for sending states to comply as a background to evalu-
ating their potential decision-making matrices.
II. VISAS AS THE NEW "NEW PROPERTY"
New property has long been hot. In a seminal article pub-
lished more than forty years ago, Professor Reich argued that
increasingly Americans derived their wealth from their relation-
ships with the government; he coined these relationships "new
property."4 Specifically, Professor Reich noted that public law
to Jamaica, 45 percent stated that they would have preferred more prison time over de-
portation. Id at *153-54.
62 See Joanne Csete and Dirk van Zyl Smit, Pretrial Detention and Health,- Unin-
tended Consequences, Deadly Results 33-54, 64 (Open Society Foundations 2011), online
at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/defaultlfiles/ptd-health-20111103.pdf
(visited Mar 3, 2013) (noting the high population of pretrial detainees in North America,
but concentrating primarily on the health issues from overcrowding in prisons outside
North America); Ralf Jirgens, Manfred Nowak, and Marcus Day, HIV and Incarcera-
tion: Prisons and Detention, 14 J Intl AIDS Socy 1, 2-3 (2011), online at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmelarticles/PMC3123257/pdf/1758-2652-14-26.pdf (visited Mar 3,
2013) (recounting high rates of AIDS in prisons all over the globe). In February 2012,
Honduras experienced one of the worst prison fires in a century when a lit cigarette al-
legedly started a fire that killed more than 350 inmates. Mayra Navarro, "All Hondurans
in Mourning" Prison Fire Kills 359, Desperate Relatives Plead with Officials for Infor-
mation about Loved Ones, The Gazette (Montreal) A17 (Feb 16, 2012).
63 Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 81 (cited in note 9).
64 Reich, 73 Yale L J at 734-37 (cited in 27). Like Professor Reich, I utilize the term
"property" not in the traditional Blackstonian sense that generations of lawyers now as-
sociate with alienability and despotic ownership, among other things, but rather as the
word "property" is utilized in a modern sense to refer to a more abstract and complicated
network of legal entitlements and obligations that serve both private and public goals. Id
at 738. For a similar utilization of the new property concept, albeit in the entirely differ-
ent arena of cyberspace, see generally Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex
L Rev 715 (2003).
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entitlements were a primary source of income for millions of
Americans.65
Critically, the aforementioned entitlements are entirely de-
rivative of government actions. In this way, government is sup-
planting a role historically fulfilled by a market economy and
private law. While the importance of new property in providing
support to citizens and permanent residents has long been rec-
ognized, far less recognized is the role that government plays in
providing support to aliens with less longstanding ties, including
those explicitly considered temporary residents. Moreover, the
home countries that export these aliens are also beneficiaries.
Under Professor Reich's typology, new property beneficiaries in-
clude those who receive licenses or franchises from the govern-
ment that provide them with their primary source of income.66
By this definition, migrant workers are a distinct category of re-
cipients of government largesse. Migrant workers benefit largely
as the recipients of work visas, which provide at least temporary
access to a predictable income stream.67
Visa recipients differ from the prototypical recipients of gov-
ernment largesse because they are typically ineligible for social
welfare payments.68 Rather, they are discrete recipients of gov-
ernment largesse, largely as the beneficiaries of work visas.
Without the express permission of the US government, migrants
theoretically lack access to the world's most lucrative labor mar-
ket. A similar point applies to undocumented migrants. The
65 See Reich, 73 Yale L J at 734-37 (cited in note 27). What has been far less recog-
nized is that this radical shift in our traditional conception of property has led not only to
more nontraditional property for more categories of people but also to more unconven-
tional ways of accessing traditional property through nontraditional property. For exam-
ple, in the recent subprime mortgage crisis, it emerged that significant numbers of low-
income Americans had been able to get mortgages. See Alex F. Schwartz, Housing Policy
in the United States 297-302 (Routledge 2d ed 2010). Many of these mortgages were un-
derwritten on the basis of social welfare payments being considered as traditional "in-
come." See id. See also Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub L No 93-495, 88 Stat 1521
(1974), codified at 15 USC § 1691(a). Thus, ironically, payments that were being made
precisely on the basis that recipients could not support themselves independently in the
market economy then became the foothold for asset building in the formal economy.
66 Reich, 73 Yale L J at 734-35 (cited in note 27).
67 See Brown, 64 Vand L Rev at 1084-87 (cited in note 40).
68 See Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage
Discrimination by the States, 58 NYU Ann Surv Am L 357, 357-58 (2002). It bears em-
phasizing that despite the contentions of some public commentators, most visa recipients
are typically ineligible for public welfare benefits. Indeed, following successive iterations
of social welfare benefit reforms, efforts to restrict benefits even from permanent resi-
dents have generally withstood judicial scrutiny. See Mathews v Diaz, 426 US 67, 81-84
(1976). But see Graham v Richardson, 403 US 365, 371-72 (1971).
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United States might be said to grant implicit permission for
these persons to join the labor market through lax enforce-
ment.69 Whether de jure or de facto, visas provide the conduit to
significant income streams.
Though undoubtedly visas make possible otherwise impos-
sible financial windfalls for recipients, evidence indicates that
new property has proven particularly beneficial to the govern-
ments of countries from which migrants originate. "Domestic
collectives" such as US states and localities are now dispropor-
tionately dependent on federal government largesse due to both
direct subsidies from the federal government and their role as
indirect beneficiaries of the benefits their citizens receive.7o It is
less understood that analogous logic applies to "collectives over-
seas"-the national, state or provincial, and local governments
in the source-labor countries. Migrants in the United States are
easily the most prolific remittance senders in the world.71 Mi-
grants in the United States remit more money and do so more
reliably than do migrants elsewhere. As the finance minister of
69 This point is also implicit in Cox and Posner, 59 Stan L Rev at 844-45, 849 (cited in
note 20). They do not, however, express a critique of the federal government's apparent pol-
icy of underenforcement. This point is also made by Professor George Borjas. He goes fur-
ther, arguing that lax enforcement facilitates undocumented work and puts downward
competitive pressures on the wages of low-wage persons, including documented migrants.
George J. Borjas, Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S. Economy 57-
58, 90 (Basic Books 1990). For a discussion of the impact of low-skilled alien workers on
wages of low-wage workers, see id at 86-92. A counterargument is that lax federal immi-
gration enforcement leads visa holders to compete with a large number of undocumented
migrants, undermining their wages and the value of their visas. See id at 90. Nevertheless,
the evidence is that visa holders command higher wages in the United States than nonvisa
recipients and nonvisa recipients command significantly higher wages than they would in
their country of origin. See Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett,
The Place Premium* Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border *55
(Center for Global Development Working Paper No 148, Dec 2008), online at
http://www.cgdev.org/files/16352LfileCMP-place-premium_148.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013)
(discussing the "place premium," namely the wage gain accruing to foreign workers who
arrive in the United States, and finding that migration has a much more immediate impact
on poverty alleviation than any other policy since the wage differentials between the Unit-
ed States and most developing countries are so great).
70 Paul Krugman makes this point in his discussion of California's current econom-
ic woes. He argues that the primary distinction between California and Greece is the fact
that California's creditors understand (at least implicitly) that the federal government
stands behind California. See Paul Krugman, A Money Too Far, NY Times A27 (May 7,
2010).
71 See Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra, and Ani Silwal, Migration and Remittances:
Factbook 2011 15 (World Bank 2d ed 2011) (listing the remittances sent from the United
States as nearly double that of the next-highest country in terms of remittance outflows).
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a developing country, your preference is that your migrants em-
igrate to and remit from the United States.
III. A RACE-TO-THE-TOP FOR SOURCE-LABOR COUNTRIES?
A. The Challenge: Getting Sending States to Bear Their
Portion of the Burden
It is critical that the United States screens more effectively
for persons who are less likely to commit crime ("good types')
and expeditiously excludes those who do ("bad types"). As such,
policy makers would be expected to prioritize ex ante screening
mechanisms for good types and ex post expulsion of bad types.
How then do we identify source-labor countries that are helpful
in meeting these goals?
1. The outsourcing race.
Professors Tomer Broude and Doron Teichman provide an
original and compelling account of the political economy of
transnational crime control.72 Modeling states as rational, self-
interested, welfare-maximizing agents, they argue that coun-
tries formulate crime control policies to advance their own inter-
ests, seeking to contain crime in their own jurisdictions even if it
means shifting crime elsewhere.73 Applying game-theoretic
analyses, Professors Broude and Teichmani demonstrate how
states come to engage in crime control races, contingent on dif-
ferent national attitudes toward criminal activity.7< A case in
question concerns the outsourcing races that evolve as some
states adopt stricter policies-leading crime to shift to other
states which then adopt stricter policies to repel the new inflow
of crime.75 Developing countries that spend far less on law en-
forcement than the United States will inevitably find criminals
being outsourced to them.
72 Broude and Teichman, 62 Vand L Rev at 796-99 (cited in note 11).
73 As public choice theorists tell the story, local jurisdictions aiming to maximize
their own welfare compete among themselves to attract activities that improve their wel-
fare and deter activities that undermine their welfare. See id at 802. See also Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit Econ 416, 423 (1956). Thus,
states attempt to contain criminal behavior in their own state. The realism and neoliber-
alism schools of international relations theory, which model states as rational, self-
interested, welfare-maximizing agents, relay a similar narrative. See Broude and
Teichman, 62 Vand L Rev at 832-34 (cited in note 11).
74 See Broude and Teichman, 62 Vand L Rev at 835-45 (cited in note 11).
75 Id at 815-26.
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Professors Broude and Teichman also discuss how insourc-
ing races may evolve,7* as some states are more inclined to be le-
nient given the spin-off benefits of crime77 In sum, we can ex-
pect inefficient levels of enforcement in what is essentially a
global collective action problem.
2. Professor Schuck's shot across the bow in the
outsourcing race.
How does Professor Schuck's policy proposal fit into this
larger narrative? Presumably Professors Broude and Teichman
would characterize Professor Schuck's advocacy for using US
global heft to negotiate effective PTTs as a quintessential exam-
ple of a shot across the bow in an outsourcing race.78 Indeed, ar-
guably this race is already in full flight. The comment from a
former Jamaican Minister of National Security that began this
Article epitomizes this view.
Indeed, rather than attempt to renegotiate PTTs (as Profes-
sor Schuck proposes), other countries have acted unilaterally.
For example, despite the concerns of source-labor governments,
the United Kingdom recently sidestepped the PTT process by
passing legislation authorizing the early release from prison of
certain categories of convicted foreign nationals.79 Shortly there-
after, the British government released and deported several
overseas nationals.8o The Canadian government has been ac-
cused of similar behavior.81
76 Id at 840-45 (noting that insourcing crime can be complex since generally gov-
ernments want the economic benefits of producing crime without the detriments of its
consumption).
77 For example, excess cash from laundered money provides social benefits in inner-
city communities. See id at 823-24 (noting that money laundering is often an ideal in-
sourcing crime because the benefits and detriments can take place in different areas).
78 See Broude and Teichman, 62 Vand L Rev at 835 (cited in note 11).
79 See Barnes, Transnational Dislocations at *4-5 (cited in note 38). The Jamaican
government argued that prisoners who had not completed their sentences could only be
transferred under a PIT, which typically requires the consent of both the prisoner and
Jamaica. See Nelson: Deportees Can't Complete Sentences in Jamaica!, Jamaica Observer
(Nov 9, 2010), online at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/Nelson-Deportees-can-t
-complete-sentences-in-Jamaica_8134367 (visited Mar 3, 2013).
so See Barnes, Transnational Dislocations at *4-5 (cited in note 39). The Caribbean
has been disproportionately affected by this policy, especially Jamaica. See United Na-
tions Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the
World Bank, Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the





If we conceptualize the state's array of enforcement options
as a continuum consisting of arrest, conviction, imprisonment,
and deportation, states typically begin the outsourcing process
following imprisonment. The United Kingdom, in an effort to
short-circuit the process, is terminating imprisonment early.
Professor Schuck would like to begin outsourcing even earlier,
following conviction.82
3. How have these races evolved historically?
Professors Broude and Teichman's theoretical framework
also provides a compelling account of the last two decades of US
policy toward criminal deportees, which has inadvertently fueled
such races to its own detriment. Consider El Salvador, which is
among the top four recipients of deportees.8a When the United
States first passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 199684 (IIRIRA), which significantly
increased the crime-related removal grounds for noncitizens, El
Salvador was unprepared for the influx of criminal deportees.8*
At the time, it was a crime-insourcing state wherein criminal
enterprise was not heavily sanctioned."
Indeed, according to a Congressional Research Service
study87 this appears to have been a broader problem in the Lat-
in American countries where most criminal deportees were
sent.88 Moreover, while some criminal deportees might have been
relatively low-level criminals in the United States, many assumed
kingpin status when they returned home, running significant
ed Mar 3, 2013); Blake, America's Deadly Export at *35 (cited in note 35). See also Minis-
try of Justice Prison Service Instruction 52/2011, Immigration, Repatriation and Remov-
al Services (Nov 4, 2011), online at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offendere/psipso
psi-2011/psi-52-2011.doc (visited Mar 3, 2013).
81 See Barnes, Transnational Dislocations at *1-2 (cited in note 38).
82 See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 78 (cited in note 9).
83 Removals by Country for FY 2011 *17 (ICE 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/reports/ero-facts-and-statistics.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
84 Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546, codified in various sections of Title 8.
5 Temple, Note, 31 BC Third World L J at 209 (cited in note 35).
86 See id at 208.
87 Clare Ribando Seelke, Gangs in Central America 4-5 (Congressional Research
Service Jan 3, 2011), online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf (visited Mar
3, 2013) (describing the effects of the United States exporting criminal deportees on gang
development in Central America).
88 See Blake, America's Deadly Export at *2 (cited in note 35) (discussing the in-
crease in crime in Latin America as a product of criminal deportation, especially gang-
affiliated criminals, to Latin American countries that lacked the resources to combat
such criminals).
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criminal enterprises.89 Ironically, they utilized contacts cultivated
in the United States to traffic drugs and people back into the
United States.90
The result is that Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the major
transnational narcotic enterprise now operating in El Salvador,
was born in the United States.91 Indeed, some contagion models
of crime argue that criminal deportees not only leverage US con-
tacts to build transnational criminal enterprises, they are also
effective recruiters.92 They thereby increase the likelihood that
their fellow nationals will try to enter the United States illegal-
ly, primarily as traffickers of people and drugs; today's criminal
deportee spawns many future criminal deportees.
El Salvador is a microcosm of the Latin American-
Caribbean region. US deportation policies have accelerated the
spread of transnational narcotics gangs not only in El Salvador,
but also in Honduras, Guatemala, and several Caribbean coun-
tries, and ultimately back into the United States.93 Indeed, the
appropriately named Christopher Coke-one of the larger drug
kingpins of recent note-was originally deported from the Unit-
ed States to Jamaica.94 Coke appears to have taken advantage of
the weak institutional framework in Jamaica to build a sophisti-
cated criminal enterprise and ultimately became a major narcot-
ics exporter.95 In summary, a deportation policy which was part-
ly aimed at breaking up US narcotics gangs has backfired.
89 See Temple, Note, 31 BC Third World L J at 198-99 (cited in note 35).
90 This position is now broadly held. See, for example, Richard J. Lopez, Rich Con-
nell, and Chris Kraul, MS-18. An International Franchise, LA Times Al (Oct 30, 2005).
91 This gang is also the largest operating in Central America more generally. Its
counterpart, which has major footprints in other Central American countries, is the 18th
Street gang (M-18), which originated in Los Angeles, and, like MS-13, took root in Cen-
tral America through criminal deportees. See Temple, Note, 31 BC Third World L J at
195 (cited in note 35); Seelke, Gangs in Central America at 4 (cited in note 87).
92 See Blake, America's Deadly Export at *3 (cited in note 35).
93 Contagion theories draw heavily on studies of how mafias spread in Italy. Pro-
fessor Federico Varese's study of the effects of deliberate government policies shows that
encouraging the migration of serial mafia criminal offenders from high-crime to low-
crime areas of Italy leads the mafia to take root in previously low-crime areas. While
Professor Varese's study is internal to Italy, his analysis is nevertheless useful in consid-
ering how transnational deportation policies might have inadvertently fueled the growth
of transnational drug networks. See Federico Varese, Mafias on the Move: How Orga-
nized Crime Conquers New Territories 197-98 (Princeton 2011).
94 See Benjamin Wesier, A Case Built in New York against a Jamaican Kingpin,
NY Times A12 (May 27, 2010).
95 See id. See also Mattathias Schwartz, A Massacre in Jamaica: After the United




What has El Salvador done in response to the proliferation
of criminal deportees? Though previously an insourcing nation,
it recently enacted a highly controversial policy known as mano
dura (firm hand).96 Tough enforcement tactics and diminishing
economic opportunities incentivize gang members to flee, with
many reentering the United States.97 Indeed, one might argue
that El Salvador is now in an outsourcing race with the United
States.98
B. The Implications of the Outsourcing Race for Professor
Schuck's Proposal
What are the implications of this outsourcing race for Pro-
fessor Schuck's analysis? Professor Schuck expresses two prima-
ry concerns. First, will source-labor countries meet their com-
mitments to incarcerate their nationals for the duration of the
sentence that they would have served had they been in the
United States? Second, will deportees having served their sen-
tences simply seek to reenter the United States illegally?99
Given the outsourcing race described above, there are good
reasons for Professor Schuck to be concerned. Rather than prior-
itizing US policy goals, a rational, self-interested source-labor
country prioritizes its own goal of ensuring that the individual
does not commit crime within its own country. Indeed, it might
actually be in the short-term interest of a source-labor country
to re-export its deportees. If not de jure then de facto, a country
might re-export its criminals by encouraging them to migrate
again.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE
However, it need not be this way. However controversial its
strong-hand policing policies may be, El Salvador has only been
able to apply mano dura because it can find gang members.
That is, despite major resource constraints, the Salvadoran gov-
ernment clearly tracks gang members.0oo
96 The policy is often criticized as repressive and insufficiently respectful of civil rights.
See, for example, Temple, Note, 31 BC Third World L J at 199-200 (cited in note 35).
97 The relative contribution of these causal factors to the flight of gang members
outside of El Salvador is not as of yet properly addressed in the legal scholarship.
98 See Temple, Note, 31 BC Third World L J at 208-09 (cited in note 35).
99 Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 79 (cited in note 9).
100 See Melissa Siskind, Note, Guilt by Association: Transnational Gangs and the
Merits of a New Mano Dura, 40 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 289, 304-05 (2008).
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This speaks to a larger point: unlike the United States, the
typical source-labor country is relatively small, comprised dis-
proportionately of dense urban communities and closely knit ru-
ral communities wherein anonymity is hard to maintain.101
Source-labor countries have far better access to the hyper-local
information that enables tracking. While admittedly true that
most source-labor countries are constrained by institutional de-
ficiencies, the typical source-labor country is nevertheless well
placed to track its nationals.
Once criminal deportees are returned to the source-labor
country, there is typically asymmetrical access to information
about them between the United States and the source-labor
country. The proximity to its nationals that results from a coun-
try's small size and dense population is crucial. This proximity
enables source-labor countries to detect when deportees have
fallen off the radar screen-a potential indication that they are
seeking to illegally return to the United States. Considering that
the return rates of criminal deportees to the United States have
traditionally been worrisomely high,102 this information should
be valuable to the United States. In summary, once criminal de-
portees are released from incarceration, one would expect that a
source-labor country might leverage its proximity to its nation-
als to help ensure they do not reenter the United States if
properly incentivized.
A. The Players
In this Section, I show how immigration laws can bolster
compliance incentives for source-labor countries. Given the inev-
itable asymmetry in access to information about criminal depor-
tees between the source-labor country and the United States,
the following analysis is premised on the notion that the United
States will outsource two functions-tracking and incarceration
of certain criminal deportees.
We are specifically concerned with four actors. First, there
is the outsourcing country-the United States. Second, there is
101 This is likely to be particularly true of criminal deportees because they are in
some sense newcomers and, as such, attract attention from closely knit communities.
102 See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 79 (cited in note 9). These rates, however, have fallen
off in recent years. See id (noting that illegal immigration rates have been reduced re-
cently due to the lack of US job opportunities, stiffer border protection, and more effec-
tive law enforcement programs, which may lessen the concern of criminals reentering
illegally).
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the criminal deportee. I posit that criminal deportees may be in-
centivized to avoid criminal activity and remain in the source-
labor country through a reintegration program offering access to
employment and social welfare benefits for participation in a
mandatory tracking program administered by the source-labor
country.
The third actor is the source-labor country, which would be
obligated to incarcerate a criminal deportee for the remainder of
his sentence. Additionally, the source-labor country would ad-
minister a reintegration program to provide the aforementioned
employment and social welfare benefits. Typically, this program
would be administered through the fourth actor-community
leaders who receive benefits from the source-labor country de-
pending on the extent to which they meet their commitments to
reintegrate criminal deportees and reduce remigration.
Notably, there is also potentially a role for a private sector
player here. That is, the United States may forgo a relationship
with a source-labor country, choosing instead to delegate the in-
carceration and tracking functions in the source-labor countries
to a private entity (such an entity might be, for example, an in-
ternational equivalent of the largest private corrections compa-
ny in the United States, namely, the Corrections Corporation of
Americaos). One would have to carefully consider the incentives
for a private actor not only to incarcerate but to develop and uti-
lize a screening technology that allows them to track former de-
portees in the source-labor country.
B. Creating Incentives for the Players
This Article is predicated on a proposed bilateral arrange-
ment between Jamaica and the United Kingdom.104 Under the
proposed program, in exchange for Jamaica's speedy acceptance
of criminal deportees, the United Kingdom will provide financial
incentives that Jamaica will be obligated to spend on reintegrat-
ing criminal deportees into Jamaican communities. Community
leaders will design and administer these employment and rein-
tegration programs in exchange for a range of governmental
1os See Pam Belluck, As More Prisons Go Private, States Seek Tighter Controls, NY
Times Al (Apr 15, 1999).
104 The program has only recently been conceptualized and has not yet been imple-
mented. See Diane Abbott, The Thorny Issue of Foreign Prisoners, Jamaica Observer
(Sept 9, 2012), online at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/The-thorny-issue-of
-foreign-prisoners-.12465724 (visited Mar 3, 2013).
82 The University of Chicago Law Review [80:59
benefits. A community leader's status in relation to the Jamai-
can government will be predicated partly on his or her compe-
tence in administering these programs, as demonstrated by cer-
tain reintegration metrics.105
Ultimately, under this proposal the source-labor countries
will transform into good insourcing states. It bears emphasis:
the good insourcing state I consider differs from the traditional
conception. In my model, criminal deportees will choose to re-
main in their countries of origin, not because of lax criminal en-
forcement but because reintegration programs provide incen-
tives to do so. In the next Part, I address precisely such a
mechanism of incentivization for source-labor states.
V. THE POTENTIAL SOLUTION
The United States currently demands virtually nothing of
overseas governments, despite the benefits those governments
receive from migration.106 A consensus is emerging that sending
states must do more.
Before considering the potential contribution of source-labor
countries, I will consider auction systems. Several scholars have
advocated allocating visas to the highest-value users through an
auction system wherein visas are sold as property.107 They argue
that this mechanism will attract the most productive migrants.
Under classic property theory, property holders value property
105 The background to this Article is Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing
Immigration Compliance, 77 Fordham L Rev 2475 (2009). On the basis of a study of visa
compliance amongst guest workers under a bilateral arrangement between Jamaica and
Canada, this article posited that the United States should enter into bilateral legal
agreements as a mechanism for mitigating the asymmetrical access to information about
potential guest workers that inevitably exists between source-labor and labor-importing
countries. Id at 2493. Under this approach, the source-labor country would leverage its
proximity to its nationals to aid in screening for guest workers likely to comply with
their visas. Id at 2491-92. Simultaneously, to improve the deterrence function, the arti-
cle proposed that the United States enlist the support of the source-labor country in im-
posing sanctions on overstaying guest workers. Id at 2494-95. Under the Jamaica-
Canada program, it appears that such a model had been effective in improving visa-
compliance norms in source-labor communities and among potential guest workers. Id at
2501-05.
106 Indeed, the same point has often been made with respect to domestic businesses
that depend on cheap labor (particularly in the agricultural, construction, and service
sectors). The Obama administration's recent emphasis on sanctioning US employers who
do not verify employee documentation reflects the widespread view that such businesses
must do more to help the United States meet policy goals, particularly given the finan-
cial windfalls that they secure through a low-cost migrant workforce. See INA § 274A,
8 USC § 1324a.
107 See note 31.
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as the repository of value that they have created; every law stu-
dent learns the Lockean conception of persons jealously guard-
ing land that they have mixed with their labor.
For this reason some scholars believe that an auction-like
allocation system would render visa holders more law-abiding
overall, thereby mitigating visa overstay and national security
concerns. The assumption is that those with quasi-property
rights in visas are likely to treat their visas similarly to other
valuable property and thus not abuse the terms of their stay
(especially given the great sacrifices many prospective migrants
make to secure the funds to pay visa-related costs).10s
However, while auction systems are now regularly utilized
elsewhere in the developed world, they remain unpopular in the
United States, perhaps because of ongoing discomfort with uti-
lizing market-based criteria for determining access to the United
States.109 Yet we can maintain some of the benefits of a proposed
auction system without actually selling the visas in the way that
sales are classically understood. After all, the sale is primarily a
mechanism of identifying the highest-value users. We may also
utilize an auction to identify high-value intermediaries to act as
proxies in identifying high-value recipients. Using the priorities
Professor Schuck articulates, a high-value end user (or good
type) is one who does not break US law and a high-value inter-
mediary is one who helps identify such end users and facilitates
the speedy return of bad end users that breach US law.10
One way for the United States to utilize its leverage would
be a modified auction system wherein the United States allo-
cates visas to high-value labor-exporting countries without sell-
ing them in a free-market sense. Why do countries of origin mat-
ter? One need only consider the current nexus between countries
of origin and potential visa recipients. Even now, most people who
travel to the United States, either with or without documentation,
10 Unless of course, their countries of origin are subsidizing the purchases of the
visas (a rational course of action for many countries), which would enable some persons
to make a purchase without much sacrifice. See Not Coming to America: Why the US is
Falling Behind in the Global Race for Talent 28-30 (Partnership for a New Economy and
Partnership for New York City May 2012), online at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/
sites/all/themes/pnae/not-coming-to-america.pdf (visited Mar, 2013). One might argue
that this is precisely what countries like Singapore do when they subsidize the costs of
their highly skilled nationals traveling to the United States for study (including covering
visa costs, for example), although I should emphasize that these visas are not being sold.
109 The discomfort that attends auction systems in the United States is discussed in
Brown, 64 Vand L Rev at 1101-02 (cited in note 40).
110 Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 81-82 (cited in note 9).
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are unable to leave their countries of origin without government
help-if only to cross borders or to access the passports that they
need to travel legally.
For undocumented migrants, their government identity
cards are similarly important. These identification documents
facilitate access to consulates overseas or ease identification dur-
ing the precarious journey north.111 The larger point is that these
governments already have a significant nexus with their citizens
that makes them well placed to help meet US immigration poli-
cy goals-hence the absurdity of the United States's laissez-faire
approach.
A high-value source-labor country is one that is well placed
to help the United States maximize these functions. Perhaps the
country has a screening technology that makes it particularly
adept at identifying persons who are likely to remain law-
abiding. In such a system, developing countries would bid for la-
bor market access for their nationals by demonstrating that they
are well placed to help the United States find high-value visa re-
cipients who meet US policy goals.
Thus, while developing countries would not technically pay
for their citizens' access to the United States, they would be re-
quired to distinguish themselves as high-compliance partici-
pants by meeting certain minimal obligations for such access.
These obligations would include the duty to prescreen their na-
tionals and provide assurances to the United States of their
trustworthiness (as a proxy for law abidance). They would risk
losing visas to other countries if their citizens are not ultimately
law abiding or if they do not cooperate in facilitating the expedi-
tious expulsion of bad types from the United States.
The competition between countries to meet policy goals that
the United States deems important would stimulate a race to
the top.112 In other words, source-labor countries would help de-
fray the costs the United States would have previously had to as-
sume ex post to deal with visa violators, particularly those who
commit non-immigration-related crimes. The program would
force source-labor countries to internalize negative externalities
111 See Graham Gori, A Card Allows U.S. Banks to Aid Mexican Immigrants, NY
Times C3 (July 6, 2002).
112 See Broude and Teichman, 62 Vand L Rev at 800-02 (cited in note 11) (discuss-
ing the effects of competition between countries in the realm of international crime con-
trol in the context of public choice "race to the bottom" literature).
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previously shouldered by the United States.113 The basic features
that make a market attractive would exist in this system without
the notion of a sale that offends many Americans.
Before ending this Part, a note on the utilization of the met-
aphor of an auction is in order. While the utilization of the term
"auction" here is metaphorical, it highlights the insight that en-
tities that bid for visas are more likely to value them. Ultimate-
ly, when developing countries are properly incentivized they can
perform important roles in the ex ante prescreening process and
the ex post expulsion process.
CONCLUSION
Given that labor-importing countries like the United States
are rightly preoccupied with whether migrants will obey US law,
source-labor countries seek to convince the labor-importing
country's government that their citizens are law abiding. To do
so, source-labor country governments must incur a cost to en-
sure that they choose those citizens who will actually comply
with visa terms. Some source-labor country governments can
more easily access predictive information about their citizens or
take greater measures than others to ensure that their citizens
abide by the visa's terms of admission-that is, that the defec-
tion rate is minimized. Consequently, one can dichotomize
source-labor countries into high performing (that is, their na-
tionals have minimal defection rates from visa terms) and low
performing (relatively high defection rates).
Ideally, through a competitive auction process for visas the
high performing countries will pressure the low performers as
everyone races to the top. Notwithstanding Professor Schuck's
call for a tougher approach to pressure Latin American and Car-
ibbean countries to expeditiously accept their nationals, similar
113 See Schuck, 171 Pol Rev at 82 (cited in note 9) (discussing how the similar strat-
egy of PTT reform would be "immensely cost-effective" for the United States because the
receiving country would take on some of the burdens created by detainees). It bears em-
phasis that when Guyana objected to the United States's deportation policy at least part-
ly on this basis, the United States threatened to cease issuing visitors' visas to Guyanese
nationals, leading Guyana to quickly fall in line. Guyana was "forced" to assume costs for
which it had not budgeted. See Guyana: Information on the Treatment of Criminal De-
portees (Citizenship and Immigration Services Feb 12, 2004), online at http://www
.uscis.gov/portal/siteluscis/menuitem.5afgbb95919f35e66f6l4l76543f6dla/?vgnextoid
=6226361cfb98dO10VgnVCM10000048f3d6alRCRD&vgnextchannel=d2dle8939Ob5dO1O
VgnVCM10000048f3d6alRCRD (visited Mar 3, 2013); Randall Richard, The Deportation
of Crime-U.S. Policy Causing Problems Elsewhere, Seattle Times A3 (Nov 17, 2003).
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goals can be achieved through softer strategic institutional de-
sign tweaks.
